There’s a question nobody in the auto industry dares state plainly about Stellantis: what’s the point of having Alfa Romeo, Chrysler, Citroën, Dodge, DS, Fiat, Jeep, Lancia, Maserati, Opel/Vauxhall, Peugeot, Ram, and Abarth in the same group?

The standard answer talks about scale economies, shared platforms, and global market coverage. These are valid arguments. But they mask a deep structural tension: at 14 brands, the risk of cannibalization and identity dilution is immense.

The challenge of multi-brand management at this scale

Volkswagen Group manages 9 major brands and is considered a reference case in multi-brand portfolio management. LVMH manages dozens, but in luxury — a sector where segmentation is more tolerant of dispersion. Stellantis at 14 automotive brands is in a category of its own.

The difficulty isn’t operational — shared platforms, group purchasing, R&D economies, those work. The difficulty is identity-based: how do you ensure Peugeot and Citroën remain clearly distinct in the consumer’s mind? How do you articulate the difference between DS and Alfa Romeo when both target European premium? What is Lancia’s reason for being in a world where every niche is already occupied?

These questions have no easy answers, and automakers who don’t answer them clearly end up drowning heritage brands in mediocrity.

The EV strategy as additional complexity

The shift to electric has added a layer of complexity to portfolio management.

Every brand needs credible electric references to stay relevant. But developing an EV lineup per brand — even on a shared platform — requires significant investment in design, communication, and distribution networks.

Carlos Tavares, the former CEO who drew up the “Dare Forward 2030” strategy, made the deliberate choice that platforms would be the lever for economies, and brands would be the lever for differentiation. The strategy is logical. But it demands execution discipline that Stellantis hasn’t always maintained.

The 2024 financial results were a wake-up call: margins under pressure, sales declining, and a CEO departure that signaled something wasn’t working in execution.

What the Stellantis case says about mergers

The PSA-FCA merger that created Stellantis in 2021 had genuine industrial logic. The problem is that auto mergers don’t mechanically create value — they create size, which is different.

Size generates cost synergies, which Stellantis has indeed realized. But size doesn’t generate brand desire. And in automotive — especially in an EV transition where consumers must be convinced to adopt new habits — brand desire remains central.

Stellantis must make the choice its competitors have refused to make: prioritize certain brands, accept reducing others to more limited roles, and concentrate investment where identity is strongest and market potential is clearest.

That’s not what mergers announce. But it’s often what mergers force, a few years later.